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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JOHN CALL and CLARK JENKINS, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants 
vs 
CITY OF WEST JORDAN, UTAH 
D e f e n d a n t - R e s p o n d e n t 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Case No . 880047CA 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
AND 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
J u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e U tah C o u r t of A p p e a l s t o c o n s i d e r t h i s 
a p p e a l i s g r a n t e d i n S e c t i o n 7 8 - 2 a - 3 ( h ) . 
N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h e f o r e g o i n g , t h e R e s p o n d e n t c o n t e n d s , as 
e x p l a i n e d h e r e i n , t h a t t h e U t a h C o u r t i o f A p p e a l s h a s no 
a u t h o r i t y t o amend o r m o d i f y t h e j u d g m e n t o f t h e t r i a l c o u r t , 
when s u c h j u d g m e n t was m e r e l y i n f u l l and c o m p l e t e c o m p l i a n c e 
w i t h t h e m a n d a t e o f t h e U t a h S u p r e m e C o u r t i n C a l l I I I . [ 7 2 7 
P .2d 180 ( U t a h 1 9 8 6 ) ] 
T h i s c a s e h a s b e e n e x h a u s t i v e l y l i t i g a t e d , b e g i n n i n g i n 
1 9 7 8 . I t h a s b e e n c o n s i d e r e d by t h e Utal+i S u p r e m e C o u r t f o u r 
t i m e s " o n t h e m e r i t s " ( w i t h t h r e e w r i t t e n o p i n i o n s ) and f i v e 
t i m e s on p r o c e d u r a l i s s u e s . 
The i n s t a n t a p p e a l t o t h e U t a h C o u r t o f A p p e a l s a r i s e s 
f r o m a j u d g m e n t e n t e r e d i n O c t o b e r 1987 by t h e T h i r d J u d i c i a l 
D i s t r i c t C o u r t i n and f o r S a l t Lake C o u n t y . 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
T h i s a c t i o n p r e s e n t s t h e f o l l o w i n g i s s u e s f o r r e v i e w : 
1 . W h e t h e r a j u d g m e n t , e n t e r e d by t h e t r i a l c o u r t 
i n s t r i c t c o m p l i a n c e w i t h t h e d i r e c t i o n s o f t h e U t a h 
S u p r e m e C o u r t , may be r e v i e w e d and m o d i f i e d by t h e 
U tah C o u r t o f A p p e a l s , upon u n p r o v e n i s s u e s n o t f o u n d 
by t h e t r i a l c o u r t and n o t p r e v i o u s l y " a p p e a l e d " by 
t h e P l a i n t i f f . 
2 . W h e t h e r t h e f a i l u r e o f c o u n s e l t o c o r r e c t l y 
a n t i c i p a t e a r u l i n g o f t h e U t a h S u p r e m e C o u r t 
c o n s t i t u t e s " b a d f a i t h " , w a r r a n t i n g an a w a r d o f 
a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s as a s a n c t i o n , when t h e t r i a l c o u r t 
" f o u n d " i n f a v o r o f c o u n s e l on t h e a s s e r t e d " f a c t " . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
T h i s a c t i o n was o r i g i n a l l y f i l e d i n 1978 t o c h a l l e n g e t h e 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y and v a l i d i t y o f a m u n i c i p a l o r d i n a n c e 
p r o v i d i n g For t h e i m p o s i t i o n o f an " i m p a c t f e e " upon d e v e l o p e r s 
o f l a n d . F o l l o w i n g an a d v e r s e d e c i s i o n f r o m t h e U t a h S u p r e m e 
C o u r t , t h e p l a i n t i f f s r e s t r u c t u r e d t h e i r t h e o r y t o a l l e g e an 
" a s a p p l i e d " u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y . 
T h e r e a f t e r t h e P l a i n t i f f s a g a i n r e s t r u c t u r e d t h e i r c l a i m s 
t o a l l e g e t h e i m p a c t f e e o r d i n a n c e was i n v a l i d b e c a u s e o f 
n o n - c o m p l i a n c e w i t h c e r t a i n s t a t u t o r y r e q u i r e m e n t s . On t h i s 
i s s u e , t h e P l a i n t i f f s r e c e i v e d a f a v o r a b l e d e c i s i o n f r o m t h e 
U t a h Supreme C o u r t i n 1 9 8 6 . 
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In the instant appeal the Plaintifffs seek to restructure 
their claims, by providing for the expansion of the decision of 
the Utah Supreme Court, so as to make the case involve a 
federal "civil rights" violation and to prjovide for recovery on 
various "procedural" matters. 
SUMMARIES OF ARGUMENT 
1. The Utah Court of Appeals shoulid not interfere 
with the trial court's judgment entered consistent 
with the directions mandated by the Utah Supreme 
Court in the Call III decision [727 P.2d 180 (Utah 
1986) 
2 . Plaintiffs' failure to present evidence 
concerningthe alleged "civil rights" violation, to 
not litigate the "civil rights" issue and to 
"appeal" the "civil rights" issue (directly or on 
"rehearing") precludes the Plaintiffs from now 
asserting the same. 
3. Plaintiffs' failure to properly litigate, 
prevail upon, and appeal (directly and/or on 
"rehearing") the alleged "civil rights" violation 
issue precludes the Plaintiffs from recovering 
attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. 
4. The defense of this case was not conducted in 
bad faith so as to justify the award of attorney's 
fees to the Plaintiffs. 
3 
5 . P l a i n t i f f s ' c l a i m f o r r e i m b u r s e m e n t o f t h e 
M a s t e r ' s f e e s i s i m p r o p e r as t h e P l a i n t i f f s d i d n o t 
p r e v a i l on a c c o u n t i n g i s s u e s and t h e P l a i n t i f f s 
w a i v e d t h e p r e p a r a t i o n o f t h e M a s t e r ' s f i n a l r e p o r t . 
6 . P l a i n t i f f s ' " m o t i o n f o r j o i n d e r o f a d d i t i o n a l 
p a r t y - p l a i n t i f f s " i s a t h i n l y - d i s g u i s e d " m o t i o n f o r 
c l a s s c e r t i f i c a t i o n " , w h i c h h a s b e e n e x h a u s t i v e l y 
l i t i g a t e d and u n i f o r m l y d e c i d e d a d v e r s e l y t o t h e 
P l a i n t i f f s , a t a l l l e v e l s . 
ARGUMENT 
This litigation, like "Ole Man River", just keeps "rollin' 
along." The legal issues involved in the instant appeal cannot 
be properly understood and appreciated without an understanding 
of the laborious history of this litigation. 
In 1978 the Plaintiffs filed this litigation to challenge 
the constitutionality of an ordinance which provided that an 
"impact fee" be paid by land-developers (subdividers) . In 1979 
the Utah Supreme Court upheld the facial constitutionality of 
the "impact fee" ordinance. Call vs City of West Jordan, Utah, 
606 P.2d 217 (Utah 1979) [hereinafter Call I]. 
However, following Plaintiffs' petition for rehearing, the 
Utah Supreme Court remanded the case for trial in the district 
court on the issue of whether the impact fee assessed against 
the Plaintiffs was "reasonable", that is, whether the impact 
fee assessed and collected bore a reasonable relationship to 
4 
the needs created by the Plaintiffs' development. Call vs City 
of West Jordan, Utah, 614 P.2d 1257 (Ut|ah 1980) [hereinafter 
Call II]. 
In the spring of 1981 in a radical departure from their 
claimed assertion that there was "no enabling legislation" (a 
point upon which the Utah Supreme Court had decided adversely 
to them) the Plaintiffs filed, against Defendant's objection, 
an "amended" complaint, claiming, inter alia, that there was 
no compliance with the provisions of Section 10-9-25, Utah 
Code, in that it was alleged there was no "public hearing" held 
concerning the adoption of the impact fee ordinance. The 
amended complaint also pleaded numerous other "theories" of 
recovery against the Defendant. 
In November 1981, following denial (by Judge Jay Banks of 
the Third District Court) of Plaintiffs' renewed motion for 
class action certification, the Plaintiffs filed an 
interlocutory appeal on the "class action" issues. The Utah 
Supreme Court denied that appeal without formal opinion. 
December 8, 1981. Docket No. 18098. 
Thereafter the Plaintiffs filed an original proceeding in 
the Utah Supreme Court seeking a writ of Mandamus against Judge 
Banks to require him to enter formal findings concerning his 
refusal to certify the class action. Th£ Utah Supreme Court 
declined to issue the writ of mandamus against Judge Banks. 
February 10, 1982. Docket No. 18217. 
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In August 1982 the Defendant filed an interlocutory appeal 
concerning Judge Rigtrup's ruling, denying to the Defendant a 
jury trial on the "reasonableness" of the impact fee. The Utah 
Supreme Court declined to consider the interlocutory appeal. 
On September 1 and 2, 1982 and November 18, 1982, trial 
was held before the Honorable David B Dee of the Third District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County. At the conclusion of the 
presentation of Plaintiffs1 evidence, the Defendant moved to 
dismiss the Plaintiffs' claims, as such had not been proved by 
a preponderance of the evidence. That motion was granted by the 
trial court. That ruling prevented the Defendant from 
presenting its case-in-chief in response to Plaintiffs' 
unproven claims. [A copy of Judge Dee's Memorandum Decision is 
attached hereto as Attachment B.] 
The Plaintiffs thereafter appealed Judge Dee's dismissal. 
In July 1986 the Utah Supreme Court issued its Call III 
decision, holding that no "public hearing" had been held and 
the impact fee ordinance was invalid. 727 P.2d 180 (Utah 1986) 
The Utah Supreme Court denied Plaintiffs' claims for "class 
action certification". The Utah Supreme Court remanded the case 
back to the district court "to enter judgment consistent with 
this opinion." 727 P.2d at 184. 
The Plaintiffs petitioned for rehearing on the issue of 
the Court's refusal to favorably consider the "class action" 
certification. The Defendant petitioned for rehearing on the 
issue that the Court's ruling (concerning the "public hearing") 
was based upon insufficient evidence (precipitated by the trial 
court's dismissal of Plaintiffs' claims at the conclusion of 
6 
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In September 1987 FOURTEEN MONTHS AFTER THE Call III 
DECISION WAS ANNOUNCED the Defendant, frustrated that the 
Plaintiffs' counsel was doing nothing to move the case to final 
disposition as ordered by the Utah Supreme Court, moved for 
entry of judgment. On October 11, 1987 after numerous 
hearings concerning the judgment and its "form", Judge Brian 
entered the written order and "judgment." 
THE JUDGMENT WAS PAID BY THE DEFENDANT ON THAT DATE. 
Thereafter, the Plaintiffs filed motions for the award of 
litigation expenses. The great majority of the claimed expenses 
was denied by Judge Brian. 
Thereafter, the Plaintiffs filed this appeal with the Utah 
Supreme Court. The case was subsequently "poured over" to the 
Utah Court of Appeals. 
I 
THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT IS CONSISTENT WITH 
THE DIRECTIONS MANDATED BY THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
AND SHOULD BE AFFIRMED 
On July 23, 1986, the Utah Supreme Court filed its third 
opinion in the above-entitled action. 727 P.2d 180 (Utah 1986). 
That decision held that the West Jordan flood-control impact 
fee ordinance, adopted in 1975, was invalid due to the City's 
alleged failure to hold a "public hearing" prior to the 
adoption of the ordinance. The decision also analyzed (and 
denied) Plaintiffs' claim for "class action" certification. The 
decision of the trial judge on other issues was left untouched! 
In disposing of the appeal, the Utah Supreme Court was explicit 
8 
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Plaintiffs' counsel openly admitting before Judge Brian 
that his motion (to have the Court enter judgment on the "civil 
rights violations" claims) is for the purpose of increasing his 
attorney's fees asserts that this Court may enter judgment on 
issues outside of the scope of the Supreme Court's directive. 
With such an assertion the Defendant must strongly disagree. 
Not only does that run counter to the clearly-expressed 
direction of the Supreme Court, but it runs afoul of 
well-established legal principles. 
In addressing the powers of the trial court in this 
situation, Corpus Juris Secundum at "Appeal and Error", § 1965, 
Where, however, the appellate court by its 
decision and directions puts an end to the 
litigation, the lower court is without jurisdiction 
except to comply with whatever directions are made; 
and frequently the directions given on remand impose 
limitations either as to subject matter or relieve, 
or both, so that the trial court has power and 
discretion only within the limitations imposed. 
Matters disposed of and determined by the opinion and 
decision of the appellate court cannot be relitigated 
in the trial court. The rule is more explicitly and 
definitely stated in some cases which hold that, 
where a case is remanded with specific directions, 
the lower court is without power to do anything but 
carry out the directions, and the judgment of the 
lower court entered in conformity with the 
requirements of the mandate and embodying a complete 
determination of the rights of the parties exhausts 
the court's jurisdiction as to matters decided. Thus, 
where the appellate court has tried the case de novo, 
its judgment is final and nothing remains for the 
trial court to do except enter the judgment. 
Emphasis added. Citations to footnotes omitted. 
Section 1966 of "Appeal and Error" in Corpus Juris 
Secundum notes: 
On the remand of the cause after appeal, it is 
the duty of the lower court to comply with the 
mandate of the appellate court and to obey the 
10 
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Likewise, the trial court generally does not have 
power to open, vacate, or modify a jtidgment or decree 
entered by it if i strict conformiI:y to the mandate of 
the appellate court, withou t o b t a i  i i i i m g f: h e c o n s e n t: o f " 
the appellate court. 
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which were r a i s e d or which m i g h t have b e e n r a i s e d on 
a p p e a "I 1 h e n e c e s s i t y o f s u c h a r i i ] i n g i s a p p a ren t i n 
11 i e p r e v e n t i o n o f p i e c e m e a l a p p e a l s . O n c e a m a t t e r 
1 ias b e e n h e a r d , w i t h o p p o r t u n i t y for c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f 
all relevant issues, there is meri t in bringing it: to 
r e s t . L i t i g a t i o n m u s t c o m e t o an e n d in o r d e r t h a t 
the parties can know w i t h certainty the i i: s t: a 11 i s . 
321 P. 2d at 9 5 3-954. Empl lasis added. 
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In Powerine Company vs Zions Savings Bank and Trust 
Company, 148 P.2d 807 (Utah 1944), the trial court following 
remand on appeal made new findings of fact and conclusions of 
law. Because those new findings were "at variance" with the 
Supreme Court's earlier decision, one of the parties again 
appealed. The Supreme Court noted that "no new determination 
should have been made by the trial court, except by way of 
entering findings to conform to the previous opinion." 148 P.2d 
at 808. The Utah Supreme Court then continued: 
. . ,. For as said in Kelsch v. Dickson, 71 N.D. 430, 
1 N.W..2d 347, 349: 
"However wise a man may be, however sound 
his judgment and understanding, 
nevertheless, he is bound to subordinate to 
the wisdom, judgment, knowledge and 
understanding of a superior court, whose 
order is the law of the case, until 
modified, or until reversed by higher 
authority. 
Our pronouncements are the law of the case, 
binding not less upon us than upon the lower court. 
We therefore shall not review them. 
148 P.2d at 808. Emphasis added. 
In Street vs Fourth Judicial District Court, 191 P.2d 153 
(Utah 1948), the Utah Supreme Court observed: 
As a general rule, where a judgment or decree is 
affirmed or reversed and remanded with directions to 
enter a particular judgment, the trial court may not 
permit amended or supplemental pleadings to be framed 
to try rights already settled. This rule is not only 
reasonable, but necessary, if litigation is ever to 
come to an end. After an appellate court has once 
ruled upon issues presented to it, such ruling 
becomes the law of the case, and the trial court is 
bound to follow it, even though it considers the 
ruling erroneous. 
191 P.2d at 158. Emphasis added. Citation to authority omitted. 
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determined the case before it and remanded it to the 
lower court, the latter is without power to modify, 
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depart from the judgment of the reviewing court; that 
the judgment of the reviewing court is not reviewable 
In any way by the court below and the lower court 
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and motions from Plaintiffs1 counsel, dictated the "form" of 
the judgment, to be "consistent with" the Call III decision. 
His decision should be affirmed. 
II 
PLAINTIFFS ARE PRECLUDED FROM LITIGATING AND 
APPEALING THE ALLEGED "CIVIL RIGHTS VIOLATION" 
The Plaintiffs assert that the "Judgment"be "expanded" to 
include recovery for an alleged, but unproved, "civil rights 
violation". The Plaintiffs' are not entitled to such as a 
matter of law. The material facts necessary for such a judgment 
are not only in dispute, but have been already decided 
adversely to the Plaintiffs! 
In 1977 the Plaintiffs owned land outside the city limits 
of West Jordan. The Plaintiffs voluntarily applied for 
annexation to the City, which was effected in 1977. The 
Plaintiffs thereafter applied for approval to develop the 
Wescall subdivision. They received such approval and paid the 
flood-control impact fee. At the time of payment no "protest" 
was filed against the assessment of the impact fee. [The 
dismissal of the Plaintiffs' claims before the Defendant was 
required to present its defense case-in-chief precluded 
receiving testimony from the named-plaintiffs on this issue.] 
When the case was actually tried before Judge Dee in 
November 1982, the Plaintiffs presented absolutely NO EVIDENCE 
as to any "civil rights violation." The Plaintiffs did not even 
testify and were not even present for the trial! 
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§ 1 9 8 3 . I n d e e d , u n d e r t h e p r e v a i l i n g ca se law a t t h e t i m e , a 
m u n i c i p a l i t y was no t a " p e r s o n " which cou ld v i o l a t e t h e " c i v i l 
r i g h t s " of a p e r s o n . Monroe vs P a p e , 365 U.S . 167 ( 1 9 6 1 ) . I t 
was not u n t i l 1978 one year a f t e r t h e P l a i n t i f f s p a i d t h e i r 
impact f e e s t h a t t h e Uni ted S t a t e s Supreme Court r e v e r s e d t h e 
Monroe vs Pape d e c i s i o n and d e c l a r e d t h a t a m u n i c i p a l i t y was a 
" p e r s o n " f o r p u r p o s e s of §1983 l i a b i l i t y . Monell vs Department 
o f S o c i a l S e r v i c e s , 436 U.S . 659 ( 1 9 7 8 ) . P l a i n t i f f s have made 
a b s o l u t e l y no s h o w i n g t h a t Monel l was t o be a p p l i e d 
" r e t r o a c t i v e l y ." 
I t i s n o t a " c i v i l r i g h t s v i o l a t i o n " m e r e l y b e c a u s e 
someone pays an i m p a c t f e e n o t even " u n d e r p r o t e s t " and 
t h e n FOUR YEARS LATER ( i n 1981) f i r s t r a i s e s t h e c la im of a 
" c i v i l r i g h t s v i o l a t i o n " (which was n o t even p r o v e d ) and t h e n 
NINE YEARS AFTER t h e f ee was p a i d , t h e Supreme C o u r t 
d e c l a r e s on t h e b a s i s of on ly p a r t of t h e e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d 
and n o t upon a c o m p l e t e p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h e C i t y ' s 
d e f e n s e t h a t t h e o r d i n a n c e , under which t h e f e e s were p a i d , 
was i n v a l i d l y a d o p t e d . 
No one made t h e P l a i n t i f f s annex i n t o West J o r d a n ; t h e y 
d i d so v o l u n t a r i l y so t h e y c o u l d make u s e fo r t h e i r own 
e c o n o m i c and b u s i n e s s p r o f i t of t h e a v a i l a b l e i n f r a s t r u c t u r e 
( r o a d s , s e r v i c e s and u t i l i t i e s ) w i t h i n t h e C i t y . I f t h e 
P l a i n t i f f s r e a l l y t h o u g h t t h e i r " c i v i l r i g h t s " were b e i n g 
" v i o l a t e d " by payment of t h e f e e , Why d i d t h e P l a i n t i f f s w a i t 
f o r FOUR YEARS t o even r a i s e t h e i s s u e of t h e a l l e g e d " c i v i l 
r i g h t s " v i o l a t i o n ? 
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It is perhaps understandable why Plaintiffs1 counsel (as 
contrasted from Plaintiffs themselves) wants to have a "civil 
rights violation" judgment: arguably under the provisions of 42 
U.S.C. § 1988, the Plaintiffs would be thus entitled to an 
award of attorney's fees. 
Ill 
AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1988 
IS IMPROPER BECAUSE PLAINTIFFS DID NOT PREVAIL 
ON THE "CIVIL RIGHTS CLAiM" 
The flaw in Plaintiffs' claim for award of attorney's fees 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 is that, $s shown above, the 
Plaintiffs did not prevail in their assertion of a civil rights 
violation. 
IV 
THE DEFENDANT DID NOT CONDUCT 
ITS DEFENSE IN "BAD FAITH" SO AS TO JUSTIFY 
AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES 
Plaintiffs claim that the award of attorney's fees should 
be awarded by reason of the Defendant's alleged "bad faith" (a 
Rule 11 violation) for having claimed th$t a "public hearing" 
was held. 
The flaw in Plaintiffs' analysis is that the conclusion of 
the Utah Supreme Court on that issue is not, per se, evidence 
of the Defendant's (or its counsel's) "bad faith": it is 
certainly well nigh to impossible to predict how the Utah 
Supreme Court will rule on an issue. 
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In this context, it must be remembered that THE TRIAL 
COURT FOUND THAT A "PUBLIC HEARING" WAS HELD. Thus, the holding 
of the "public hearing" was not merely the unsubstantiated 
assertion of counsel; if was a "finding" of the trial court. 
And further, one must remember that such a determination 
of the trial court was on the basis of only a part of the 
evidence available to the Defendant. [When Judge Dee had ruled 
that the Defendant (City) had complied with Judge Rigtrup's 
pre-trial order" (concerning evidence of the "public hearing"), 
he ruled that the City need not put on additional evidence. In 
this regard, it is significant to note that the Supreme Court's 
ruling (In Call III) thus was (1) based upon only a partial 
quantity of the evidence and (2) precluded the City from 
presenting its case-in-chief. This anomalous result was 
unsuccessfully pointed out to the Utah Supreme Court in the 
Defendant's petition for rehearing. ] 
And one must also remember that it was the Plaintiffs who, 
in April 1987, obtained a writ of mandamus from the Utah 
Supreme Court preventing the re-opening of the Defendant's 
case. The Plaintiffs cannot have "their cake and eat it too". 
The mere fact that the Plaintiffs "win" does not mean that 
the Defendant conducted its defense "in bad faith." 
That the Utah Supreme Court would interpret "public 
hearing" differently does not establish the Defendant's "bad 
faith". The significant factor is that THE TRIAL JUDGE 
DETERMINED THERE HAD BEEN A PUBLIC HEARING. The Defendant can 
hardly be faulted when the trial court makes such a finding. 
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Furthermore, the Defendant was precluded from presenting 
its entire case in chief. The Defendant's preliminary 
presentation was never intended to constitute the entire 
case-in-chief of the City. Indeed, Judge Dee recognized this 
when he allowed (January 1987) the Defehdant to re-open the 
case to present its case-in-chief. 
Judge Dee's dismissal of the Plaintiffs' claims at the 
conclusion of the presentation of Plaintiffs' evidence 
PRECLUDED the City from having its full "day in court" on this 
issue and the full litigation of Section 10-9-25. 
The testimony presented by the Defendant concerning the 
public hearing was merely in compliance with the Court's 
pre-trial order. Judge Dee repeatedly ruled that the City had 
complied with its pre-trial order. He stated: 
. . . I have already ruled on the question whether I 
thought he's complied with Judge Rigt^up's order, and 
I think he has, . . . 
Record at 1711-1712. Emphasis added. 
In Call III the Supreme Court ruled that no "public 
hearing" had been held and directed that judgment be entered 
against the City. It is highly unusual that the Supreme Court 
would so rule and thus totally dispose of the legal issues, 
without giving the Defendant the opportunity to fully present 
its case-in-chief, when the trial court repeatedly found there 
was compliance with that pre-trial order. [The correct 
procedure would have been to remand the case for presentaton of 
the City's case-in-chief.] 
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In any event, the finding of the trial court (Judge Dee) 
that a public hearing had been held visciates any and all 
claims that the Defendant's defense was asserted or maintained 
"in bad faith". The fact that the Supreme Court contrary to 
principles of the "law of the case" and its clear direction in 
Call II as to the issues to be tried allowed, over the 
Defendant's objection, consideration of other issues certainly 
could not have been reasonably expected. The fact that the 
Supreme Court would totally dispose of the issue, without 
receiving the entire quantum of evidence available and without 
giving the Defendant an opportunity to present its 
case-in-chief, could not have been expected. 
The mere fact that the Plaintiff prevails on a 
technicality, decided by the Supreme Court as a matter of first 
impression, does not render the Defendant's assertion of its 
defenses thereto "in bad faith". The Plaintiffs are not 
entitled to an award of attorney's fees. 
V 
PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO REIMBURSEMENT 
OF THE MASTER'S FEES BECAUSE THE PLAINTIFFS 
DID NOT PREVAIL ON THE "REASONABLENESS" ISSUE AND 
BECAUSE THE PLAINTIFFS WAIVED THE PREPARATION 
OF THE MASTER'S FINAL REPORT 
In September 1980, Judge Rigtrup of this Court ordered the 
Defendant "to identify the records and indicate where they may 
be found." 
The Defendant did so. Thereafter the Plaintiffs' counsel, 
in my opinion, continued to "play dumb" by claiming the records 
of the City were unintelligible to him. The culmination of that 
attitude was the Plaintiffs' motion "to appoint a master" to go 
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through the records of the City. That motion, heard by Judge 
Conder, was granted, with the proviso that the Plaintiffs pay 
t he master's fees. 
The Master found nothing wrong with the City's records. 
The master's preliminary report concluded that it was possible 
to perform the assigned duties; however, the estimated cost for 
such was apparently greater than the Plaintiffs were willing to 
pay. THE PLAINTIFFS WAIVED THE PREPARATION OF THE FINAL 
MASTER'S REPORT. [See Attachment D in this brief.] 
It is unconscionable to think that the Defendant should 
have to pay for the Master. The Plaintiffs "lost" on the 
master-type issues (i.e. the determination as to the existence 
of the alleged "unreasonableness" of the impact fee) involved 
in this litigation. 
It is incredible to think that the Plaintiffs should be 
entitled to receive reimbursement for the paster's fees for the 
PRELIMINARY report when (1) the Master was appointed at their 
request, to provide a report at Plaintiffs' expense, to do 
work that the Plaintiffs themselves could have done but refused 
to do so, (2) the Plaintiffs WAIVED the preparation of the 
Master's final report, and (3) the Plaintiffs failed to prevail 
on any of the issues for which the Master was appointed. 
The City had no control over the services performed for 
the Plaintiffs by their expert; the Plaintiffs were responsible 
for retaining him and deciding the scope, terms and duration of 
his employment. Under such conditions, the Defendant cannot be 
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held responsible to reimburse the Plaintiffs for their "expert11 
services! This is especially the case when those services were 
performed for issues upon which the Plaintiffs ultimately lost! 
This issue was exhaustively considered by Judge Brian of 
the District Court in an advantaged position to carefully 
consider the proceedings in November 1987. He found against 
the Plaintiffs on the "costs" and "accounting fees" issues. The 
Pl a i n t i f f s ' claims for reimbursement for those costs should be 
denied. 
VI 
PLAINTIFFS' ASSERTION THAT THE CASE BE REMANDED FOR 
JOINDER OF THE INDISPENSABLE PARTY SUBDIVIDERS IS 
MERELY THE REGURGITATION OF THE PLAINTIFFS' 
PREVIOUSLY-UNSUCCESSFUL MOTIONS FOR "CLASS ACTION" 
CERTIFICATION 
The P l a i n t i f f s ' a s s e r t i o n t h a t t h e case be " r e m a n d e d " f o r 
" j o i n d e r " o f t h e a l l e g e d l y - i n d i s p e n s i b l e p a r t y sub d i v i d e r s 
b l a t a n t l y s h o w s t h e l a c k o f r e g a r d P l a i n t i f f ' s c o u n s e l h o l d s 
f o r t h e r u l i n g s o f t h e C o u r t . 
T h i s a s s e r t i o n e x h a u s t i v e l y a r g u e d b e f o r e Judge B r i a n i n 
1 9 8 7 i s m e r e l y a t h i n l y - d i s g u i s e d " c l a s s a c t i o n " 
c e r t i f i c a t i o n , w h i c h h a s b e e n REPEATEDLY DENIED BY THE TRIAL 
COURT AND BY THE SUPREME COURT. I t i s i n c r e d i b l e t h a t 
P l a i n t i f f s ' c o u n s e l w o u l d , on page 25 o f h i s " b r i e f " , make t h e 
a s s e r t i o n t h a t h i s " m o t i o n " f o r j o i n d e r o f a d d d i t i o n a l p a r t y 
p l a i n t i f f s was " c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e f o r e g o i n g a u t h o r i t y and t h e 
e x p e c t a t i o n s o f t h e U t a h S u p r e m e C o u r t . " WHAT? The S u p r e m e 
C o u r t e x p r e s s l y r u l e d a g a i n s t h im on t h e " c l a s s a c t i o n " c l a i m s . 
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To raise the "joinder" issue, particularly at this late stage, 
allegedly justified by the most novel and creative 
sleight-of-hand interpretation of the Rules, itself borders on 
"bad faith" for which sanctions are appropriate! 
Counsel's request that the case be "remanded" for the 
"joinder" proves that this litigation is not primarlily for the 
benefit of the Plaintiffs (John Call and Clark Jenkins), but 
rather is for the sole benefit of Plaintiffs1 counsel (Mr 
DeBry), who seemingly is singularly interested in dragging on 
this litigation for another decade, for his own apparent 
financial gain! 
Plaintiffs' thinly-disguised "motibn to add additional 
plaintiffs" is merely, in substance, A RESURRECTION AND 
REGURGITATION OF THE PLAINTIFFS' PREV IOUSLY-UNSUCCESSFUL 
ATTEMPTS TO HAVE THIS ACTION "CERTIFIED" AS A "CLASS ACTION. 
Such has been thoroughly litigated and decided numerous times 
and at all levels of the Utah judicial system! 
This action was originally pleaded as a "class action." 
This is now the TWELFTH TIME the "class action" has been 
examined. In each of those previous considerations, the "class 
action" certification was denied. It is incredible to think 
that at this late stage of proceedings >TEN YEARS AFTER THE 
CASE WAS ORIGINALLY FILED AND AFTER THE CASE HAS BEEN 
CONSIDERED BY THE UTAH SUPREME COURT FOUR TIMES that "class 
action" status is now appropriate, even if disguised as a 
"joinder" of allegedly-indispensible parties. 
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The Utah Supreme Court has EXPRESSLY DENIED Plaintiffs' 
requested "class certification", not once but TWICE the 
second time being AFTER the Call III decision was filed! 
The doctrine of the "law of the case" also prevents a 
re-examination of the "class action" issue. That doctrine 
states that once a case has been adjudicated and appealed, the 
law as announced by the appellate court must be followed. 
In Richardson vs Grand Central Corporation, 572 P.2d 395 (Utah 
1977), the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
The purpose of the doctrine of the "law of the case" 
is that in the interest of economy of time and 
efficiency of procedure it is desirable to avoid the 
delays and difficulties involved in repetitious 
contentions and rulings upon the same proposition in 
the same case. 
572 P.2d at 397. Emphasis added. Plaintiffs1 renewed "motion" 
is certainly a "repetitious contention . . . upon the same 
proposition." 
CONCLUSION 
For the Utah Court of Appeals to re-open the judgment 
previously entered by the trial court, following the Utah 
Supreme Court's clear mandate, does violence to longstanding 
legal principles. The Supreme Court has made it clear that this 
litigation vigorously contested for over ten years must 
come to an end! 
The Plaintiffs failed to prove their alleged "civil rights 
violation". When the case was appealed to the Utah Supreme 
Court, they failed to appeal that issue. When the Utah Supreme 
Court decided Call III, the Plaintiffs failed to challenge the 
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Court's ruling on the that issue on the "petition for 
rehearing". The Plaintiffs have thus waived) their right to have 
the Court of Appeals consider the alleged ''civil rights" issue. 
The Plaintiffs are precluded from recovering attorney's 
fees for the civil rights violation, because they did not 
prevail on that issue. 
The Court should not order the award of attorneys fees and 
the Master's costs. The Plaintiffs "waived" the preparation of 
the Master's report. The Defendant did not conduct its defense 
in "bad faith", as the trial court "found" a "public hearing" 
had been held. 
The Plaintiffs' assertion that "joinder" of "additional 
party-plaintiffs" at this late stage is merely a re-hash of the 
long-dead "class action certification" issue, uniformly and 
consistently decided against the Plaintiffs. 
DEMAND FOR ATTORNEY'S FEE^S 
The Plaintiffs' repetitious filing of frivolous appeals, 
concerning issues which have already been litigated and 
adversely decided against the Plaintiffs (and/or their 
c o u n s e l ) , warrants the imposition of sanctions (including the 
award of attorney's fees), in order to discourage such conduct. 
The Defendant respectfully seeks such an award of attorney's 
fees. 
Respectfully submitted this 17th day of May, 1988. 
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent 
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CERTIFICATE 
I certify that I caused to be hand-delivered fourcopies of 
the foregoing RESPONDENT'S BRIEF to the office of Mr Robert 3 
DeBry, 4001 South 700 East, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 17th day 




Decision of the Utah Supreme Court in Call vs City of 
West Jordan, Utah, 727 P.2d 180 (Utah 1986) 
ATTACHMENT "B" 
Memorandum Decision of Judge David B Dee, dated 22 
December 1982 
ATTACHMENT MC" 
Finding #22 of Judge David B Dee, dated 21 
ATTACHMENT "D" 
Plaintiffs' Amended Motion to Modify Order 
Master, dated 4 January 1982 
ATTACHMENT "E" 
Plaintiffs' "Petition for Rehearing" filed subsequent 
to Call III decision, dated 5 August 1986 
April 1983 
Appointing 
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John CALF* and Clark Jenkins , 
Plaintiffs and Vppcllnnla. 
v. 
CITY O F WKST J O R D A N , Utah, 
Defendan t and Responden t . 
No. 19186. 
Supreme Court of Ut ih 
Ju ly 23, 1086 
Rehear ing Denied Oct 29, 1086 
Subdividers b rough t action to ch il-
lenge validity of ordinance adopted bv city 
which required subdividers to dedicate 7% 
of proposed subdivision Knd to citv or to 
pay equivalent of that value in c i sh to be 
used for flood control a n d / o r park ind 
recreation facilities The Third District 
Court, Salt Lake County, David K Winder, 
J , upheld ordinance and subdividers ip 
pealed The Supreme Court, fiOh P Jd 217, 
affirmed and remanded On rehe iring, the 
Supreme Court, 614 P 2d 1257, upheld fi 
cial constitutionally of ordinance
 t\m\ re-
manded with instructions On remand, the 
Third District Court , Salt Lake County, 
David B. Dee, J , entered judgmen t in favor 
of city and subdividers appealed On ap 
peal, the Supreme Court, Howe, J , held 
tha t city planning and zoning commission 
failed to comply with s t a tu to ry require-
ments of public hearing prior to adoption of 
impact fee ordinance where advance notice 
to public was not provided, ordinance being 
considered had not ye t been drafted, and 
public did not have opportuni ty to von e 
their views. 
Remanded with instructions 
Stewar t , J , dissented 
1. Appeal a n d E r r o r c=>120l(3) 
District cour t did not abuse its discre-
tion in allowing developers to amend com 
plaint af ter remand, where issues in 
amended complaint were not sp^cifn dly 
foreclosed by appellate cour t dur ing prior 
2 / IMIIHK and P l a n u m i ; o=»l M, I H 
CiU pi inning ntd zoning (iiininhMim 
filled to complv with i t i t ' i t o rv leqmre 
men!1 of public he u i n g nnor In idoption of 
imp it t f< i* ordin m« •» v h« i e id\ int e notic e 
of purpose* of meet ing »\ i* not provided to 
puhiu ordinance in i i sue h id not vet been 
drafted, md public did not h u e npportum 
tv to express their views, it was not suffi 
cient t i n t ordinance v i s idopted i t regu 
I irlv scheduled cit\ count i) meet ing U C 
A i')5J, 10-0-1 to H M - J O 
1. P i r t i e s <3=»9, 11 
District court did not ibuse its discre-
tion in denying d i s s letiou s t a t u s to (level 
o p e n ch illenging impic t fee ordinance 
where proposed c I iss membc r* were idenh 
fi lble, where eac h (I um would require mdi 
viilii il consider ition by cour t r eg i ro l e s s of 
c
]
 iss s ta tus and »vhere there was no possi 
bihtv th it inconsistent j udgmen t s would be 
issued if individual c l i ims were brought 
Rule I Civ Proc , Rule 2 1 
Robert J Debry, S i l t Lake Cit \ . for 
pi nntiffs md appellants 
Stephen G Homer, Wes t Jordan City 
Atty , West Jord in, for defendant and re-
spuiukmk 
HOWE, Just ice 
Plaintiffs, John Call and CI irk Jenkins , 
appe il from the trial cour t ' s dismissal of 
their complunt and the entry of judgment 
in favor of defendant, Cit> of Wes t Jordan 
In lf)74, We>t Jord in f o i m u h t c d a plan 
to expand its flood control and pubhc park 
s>stems to meet the n u r e i s m g needs of 
the growing city As p ir t of its pi in. West 
Jordan decided to impose an imp ict fee as 
a condition to g ran t ing plat approval to 
subdivision developers The fee was seven 
percent of the land in the subdivision or, a t 
the option of the city, the equivalent value 
in ensh West Jordan, Utah , Ordinance 33, 
§ U C-S(2) (l«)7r>) Plaintiffs p u d the fees 
under protest and later hi ough t this action 
CALL v. CITY OF 
Cite UN 727 P 2d I 
We have issued two previous opinions in 
this case In our first opinion, Call v City 
of We\t Joulan, <>()<> P 2d 217 (Utah P)7<)) 
(Call I), we held t i n t U C A , 1<)5J, 
§§ I ( M M to -10 empowered West Ionian 
to exact in impact foe to proviue for Hood 
control and parks as a condition to g r i n t 
mg pi it ipproval On rehearing, in Call /• 
CUt/ oj l i e s / Joulan Utah (i l l P 2d I2r>7 
(PJ80) {Call / / ) , we upheld the f m i l eonsti 
tut ionahty of the ordinance, but we re-
manded to give plaintiffs an "opportunit> 
to p resen t evidence to show that the dedica 
tion required of them had no reasonable 
relationship to the needs for flood control 
or parks ind recre ition facilities ere ited by 
their subdivision, if any ." Id a t 1251) 
MI On remand, the tri il court allowed 
!)} nntiffs to amend their complaint to in-
clude a claim th.it the ordinance was invalid 
because West Jo rdan had not followed stat-
utory requi rements in enacting it. Al-
though West Jordan does not cross appeal 
the illowance of the amendment , it u rges 
this (Joint to limit the case to the constitu 
tional " re ison id leness" issue However, 
the pleadings may be amended after re-
mand within the sound discretion of the 
trial court so long as they do not cover 
issues specifically foreclosed by the appel-
late court Street v Foutth Judicial Dis 
4ru4 CouU^Mlnh Caunly^ l i d Utah 60+ 
P' l P 2 d 151 (PU8), Utah R Civ P 15. see 
While r Lobdelt, 1% Mont 15(>, 0,18 P 2d 
|n->7 (P)S2), Diversified Capitol Corp v 
Ciht oj \otfh Ltu> Vega, 1)5 Nev 15, 5«)0 
P2d Md (P)7«)) The trial court allowed 
West Jordan to a r g u e why the pleadings 
should not be imended, but after consider-
ition allow eil the amendment Neither 
Call I nor Call 11 specific allv addressed 
this issin , md we find no ibuse of discre 
lion in tin m i l cour t ' s d inn ing ihe mu ml 
inent l l u r e ' o i e , the issue ot whether 
West lord.in h id followed s t i l u t o i ) re 
qu i re imnts in "ii icting the ordinance was 
properh )K h u e the trial court 
Because of proolems encountered b\ the 
plun ' i f f in ^ distoverv of information in 
the p o , e sum ot West lord in md bet ause 
W E S T J O R D A N Utah 1 
M (Utah 19HA) 
Corp v South Jordan City, 031 P 2d I 
(Utah lf)Hl), the trial coui t issued a preti 
order which placed on West Jordan 1 
burden of pioducing evidence on seve 
issues These issues may be conden* 
into two main issues (1) the reason il 
nt ss of the imp ict fee as lpplied to pi, 
tiffs, and (2) whether the ordinance I 
been adopted according to sUtutor> 
quirementb 
It is necessary m this opinion to tr 
only the seioud issue West Jordan .' 
required it the threshold to present pn 
facie evidence tha t the c»t> had tollov 
the s t a tu to ry requirements contained 
U C A . 195J. §§ 1 ( M M to -JO in enact 
the ordinance Within section 25, the lej 
la ture has se t forth specific procedu 
tha t a municipality must follow to exerc 
the powers granted to it. 
In exercising the powers granted to it 
the act, the planning commission sh 
prepare regulat ions governing the sul 
vision of land within the municipality 
pubhc hearing thereon shall oe held 
the legislative body, a l t e r which the 1 
islative body may adopt said regulatic 
for the municipality 
The tri il judge held in his conclusions 
law tha t the ordinance was validly prom 
gated and tha t "[ijt w.is not shown bv 
|>«?po44de4*a«ce 4*/ Aha uv4cUmui4Jiat^the x 
failed to complv with the provisions of s 
tion 11MJ-25, Utah Code Annotated, in I 
piomulg.i t ion of the ordinance " This c 
elusion was supported by the court 's fu 
mg of fact No 22 
Prior to the adoption of the Ordman 
the governing body of the City conduct 
a public hearing in which an overall m 
ter plan for the development of the c 
was discussed ' lhis he iring (held in / 
g u s t 11)7 II vas conducted in the W 
Jordan school auditorium so as to accc 
modate the large number of citizens 
a t tendance The specific concept 
flood control anil having dn impact J 
paid by new developers was discussed 
that public he iring The Ordinance v\ 
prepaied by the West Jordan Planni 
mil 7nmnir { ' u m i n m i o n e v e n thoilt'h | 
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City At torney was responsible for tfie 
selection of the actual language used in 
the text of the Ordinance. The plaintiffs 
submit ted no evidence to show tha t a 
public hear ing was not held or that the 
Planning and Zoning Commission «Iicl not 
prepare the Ordinance. 
We need not rule on the accuracy of this 
finding to resolve the issues presented in 
this case. Never theless , we are free to 
subs t i tu te our j udgmen t for that of the 
trial court on the issue of law as to wheth-
er these facts satisfy the requirements of 
section lf>-S>-25. Olicell v. Clark, tiT>H P.2d 
585 (Utah 1982), Automotive Manufactur-
ers Warehouse, Inc. tf. Service Auto Parts, 
Inc., 59f> P.2d 1033 (Utah 11)7!)). As men-
tioned above, the pretrial order placed upon 
West Jordan the burden of making a prima 
facie showing tha t it had satisfied the re-
quirements of section 10-0-25. We hold as 
a mat te r of law tha t it failed to carry this 
burden. 
Some months prior to the Augus t 11)7-1 
public hearing, the West .Jordan Planning 
and Zoning Commission had discussed on 
numerous occasions the idea of requiring 
developers to dedicate a portion of their 
subdivision or to pay an equivalent, value in 
cash for parks and flood control. In fact, 
on March 20, 1974, the Commission adopted 
a motion to have the city require five per-
cent from subdividcrs to use for parks. A 
month later, af ter the Commission had ex-
acted the five percent fee from a t least one 
subdivider, the city planner told the Com-
mission that the city had no legal basis to 
impose the fee. During this time, a special 
committee was preparing the West Jordan 
Master Plan. The master plan speaks only 
in general te rms about the need for parks 
and recreational facilities. It also address-
es in vague terms who should pay for 
capital improvements to the city, hinting 
that incoming residents should pay more 
than existing residents because "equity in 
community improvements arc [sic] seldom 
fairly shared through taxation." Nothing 
in the master plan proposes tha t developers 
either dedicate seven percent of their subdi-
visions Or th#» rn«K oni.:«rn1««* -~ - -- •• 
RTKK. 2d SKIIIKS 
West Jordan asser ts , ho%v«»ver, tha t the 
"specific concept of flood control and hav-
ing an impact fee paid by new developers 
was discussed" at I he public hear ing on the 
mas te r [dan. The minutes of the public 
hearing were not introduced as an exhibit, 
nor a re they included in the record. How-
ever, one of the witnesses for West Jordan 
testified as to what was in the minutes: 
[Mr. Moosman:] |T)he minutes reflect 
that Mrs. Schmidt asked ( the oily plan-
ner) concerning what was going on 
with the flood ''nntrol problems. And 
perhaps I could read that . It would be 
quicker. 
[The Court) . . Co ahead and r»*ad \he 
pert inent par ts . What does Mrs. 
Schmidt say.' 
A. (The witness:) Sh«» asked [the city 
planner] to tell what the? County Flood 
Control had in mind for developers in 
t h e -
Q. Yeah. Co ahvad. 
A. [The city planner] then explained 
that each developer must Lake can* of 
his own flood water that or iginates on 
his property. They have sugges ted 
catch basins that can be used both for 
flood control and recreational u s e . . . . 
It is to be observed that an impact fee was 
not mentioned. In January 1975. four 
months after the master plan public hear-
ing, the city council enacted the ordinance 
which imposed the seven percent impact 
fee. No evidence of any other public hear-
ing remotely related to the ordinance ap-
pears in the record. 
(2J One's imagination mus t he 
s t retched beyond rational limits to accept 
the master plan public hearing as satisfy-
ing the public hearing requirement of sec-
tion 10-9-25. The ordinance was not even 
drafted until months after the mas te r plan 
public hearing. Section 10-9-25 is very 
clear in this respect. The Commission 
mus t first prepare the regulat ions, one of 
which would provide for the impact fee. 
CALL v. CITY OF 
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legislative body may adopt said regulat ions 
for the municipality. In requiring a public 
hearing, our legislature contemplated tha t 
interested parties would have an opportuni-
ty to give their views, pro and con, regard-
ing a specific legislative proposal, and 
thereby aid the municipal government in 
making its land use decisions. See gener-
ally 1 It. Anderson, American Law of Zon-
ing § 1.11 (2d ed. 197G); 8A E. McQuillin, 
The Law of Municipal Corporations 
§ 25.251 (rev. 3d ed., 1970). 
West Jordan also a rgues that because 
the ordinance was adopted a t a regular ly 
scheduled city council meeting which was 
open to the public, the public hear ing re-
qui rement was satisfied. Although the 
s t a tu t e does not specifically address the 
required notice, we hold tha t because the 
ota tute calls for a public hearing our legis-
la ture «:ontempiated something more than a 
regular city council meet ing held, so far as 
the record here discloses, without specific 
advance notice to the public tha t the pro-
posed ordinance would be considered. See 
I R. \mlersnn, American Law of Zoning 
1 1.1 i '2d ed. 197(11. Notice, to be effec-
tive, must alert the public to the na ture and 
.'.cope of 'he ordinance tha t is finally 
adopted. UL a t 200. fa i lure to strictly 
follow *Jie s ta tu tory requi rements in enact-
ing the ordinance renders it invalid. Mel-
ville t\ Salt Lake County, 51115 P.2d 133 
• l.'Lih 1975); Anderson a t 199. This well 
established rule is followed by the g rea t 
majority of jurisdictions. Annot., 9t> A.L. 
R.2d Ml) (19(M); see Town of Beverly 
Shores Plan (Commission n. En tight, M>3 
N E.2d 24 li (Ind 1984) {statute required mu-
nicipality to publish two notices in newspa-
per within t rn days nf hearing—ordinance 
invalidated wheie first notice appeared in 
newspaper el»»\en ilavs before hearing); 
Kulakoieskt v. Clarendon, 139 Vt. 519, 431 
A.2d ITS tl9Mi: Morland Development 
Co. v. Tulsa. 59t> P.2d 1255 lOkla.1979) 
(city ordinance establishing flood control 
districts invalidated because of failure to 
follow s ta tu tory requirements) . We there* 
fnre hold that the West Jordan . Utah. Orcti-
W E S T J O I U M N Utah 1 8 3 
80 (Utah I9M) 
One fur ther m a t t e r mus t be addressed. 
Plaintiffs u rge tha t we reverse the trial 
j udge ' s findings denying class action s t a tus 
to this lawsuit . We will reverse a trial 
cour t ' s decision on class action s t a tus only 
when it is shown tha t the trial court misap-
plied the law or abused its discretion. 
Gold Strike Stamp Co. v. Christensent 
43G F.2d 791 (10th Cir. 11)70); JIB J. Moore 
& J. Kennedy, Moore's Federal Practice 
§ 23.97 t2d ed. 1985); 2 II. Newberg , New-
berg on Class Actions § 7.39 (2d ed. 1985). 
In the history of this lawsuit, plaintiffs 
reques ted class action certification on three 
different occasions from three different tri-
al j udges . All three denied their reques ts . 
Plaintiffs do not a s se r t tha t the trial court 
misapplied the law in denying class action 
s t a t u s . Thus , we shall review the trial 
cour t ' s decision to determine whether it 
abused its discretion. 
[3] The trial cour t found that the "puta-
tive class is not so numerous that joinder of 
all par t ies is impracticable." Plaintiffs as-
se r t tha t the size of the class alone man-
dates t ha t joinder is impracticable. How-
ever, size of the class is not solely determi-
native of impracticability. We acknowl-
edge t h a t there may be instances where 
sheer size alone would determine impracti-
cability. One of the salutary effects of 
Rule 23, Utah R.C'.v.P.. is tha t it allows 
access to the cour ts for numerous claim-
ants to r eques t redress of claims that are 
too small to merit the expenses of litigation 
on an individual basis. I II. Newberg, 
Newberg on Class Actions § 3.03 n. 38, 
§ 3.1M a t 145 (2d ed. 1985). In other in-
s tances , the size and membership of the 
class may be unknown, which makes join-
der impractical)! ». However, we are here 
dealing with a class whose members have 
been identified. They are developers en-
gaged in business whose claims are not so 
insubstant ial tha t joinder or individual suits 
would not merit the cost. It is unlikely 
that denial of class action s ta tus would 
preclude them from pursuing their reme-
dies. See 1 Ni'whrrn :it l.lf* TIIIIUMOI or./\»». 
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would still need to he determined on an 
individual basis, regardless of class action 
status. Because of our ruling on the mer-
its of the case, there is no possibility of 
inconsistent judgments and no issue of sub-
stantial public interest remains. Given the 
'acts of this case, we cannot hold that the 
rial court abused its discretion in denying 
lass action status. 
We remand this case to the trial court to 
nter judgment consistent with this opin-
m. Costs to plaintiffs. 
HALL, CJ., and DURHAM and ZIM-
IERMAN, JJ., concur. 
STEWART, J,, dissents. 
fo |m*UH8tKSY*tlM> 
CUHIUV K. CLAUS. Plaintiff 
and Appellunt, 
v. 
Marline CLAUS, Defendant 
and Respondent. 
No. 20021. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Aug. 1, 198G. 
Divorce decree dividing marital proper-
was entered by the Third District Court, 
t Lake County, James S. Sawaya, J., and 
>band appealed. The Supreme Court 
d that: (1) division of marital property 
5 eminently fair; (2) making Internal 
venue Service obligation into husband's 
arate debt was not abuse of discretion; 
I (3) award of temporal*}' alimony to wife 
5 not abuse of discretion in view of her 
bility to earn income during parties' sep-
tion. 
1. Divorce c=»2o2.2. %IW\\\\ 
Division of marital property was emi-
nently fair in a warding approximately 
equal equities despite court not finding val-
ues of parties' premarital assets and in-
crease in those values aflcr date of mar-
riage. 
2. Divorce C=252.4 
in dividing marital property, making 
Internal Revenue Service obligation sepa-
rate debt of husband was not abuse of 
discretion in light of joint income tax re-
turns disclosing that wife's income was 
minimal at best. 
3. Divorce C=>215 
Award of owe A^ar^J^rm^omrF^Jtmo-
ny in amount of $Hf>0 per month was not 
abuse of discretion in view of wife's inabili-
ty to maintain real estate license or 
manage parties' rental properties during 
separation due to pendency of divorce. 
J. Richard Hell, Salt Lake City, for plain-
tiff and appellant. 
George II. Srarle, Salt Lake City, for 
defendant and respondent. 
PER CURIAM: 
In this divorce action, plaintiff appeals 
from that portion of the decree dealing 
with the distribution of the parties' marital 
estate and the award of temporary alimony 
to defendant. We affirm. 
The parties were married four and one-
half years before they separated. No chil-
dren were born of the marriage. Hoth had 
been married before and had brought sev-
eral pieces of real property into the mar-
riage. The trial court awarded plaintiff all 
the assets of his two corporations, real 
property owned by those corporations, and 
a rental unit acquired by the parties during 
the marriage. Defendant was awarded the 
home she lived in at the time of the divorce, 
real property the parties had acquired with 
proceeds from her real property holdings, 
and property acquired by the parties under 
uniform real estate contracts. Plaintiff 
Sf-' - •* Cc.-.vv, Uiih 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN CALL and CLARK JENKINS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CITY OF WEST JORDAN, UTAH 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDA DECISION 
Civil No. C-78-829 
The trial of the above-capticned matter on a procedural 
basis came on before this Court September 1 and 2, 1982 
following the previous Pretrial Order of Judge Rigtrup, with 
plaintiff being represented by Robert J. Debry, Esq., and 
defendant being represented by Stephen G. Homer, fesq., City 
Attorney for West Jordan. At that procedural heaping, limited 
issues of defendant's projected case in chief were presented 
for the purpose of allowing discovery to be continued on 
behalf of the plaintiff. Then, on November 18, 1982, trial 
commenced with plaintiffs producing witness Geralld Sharkey, 
a C.P.A., who went over the information which had been 
obtained by defendant as a result of the discovery previously 
allowed. 
At the conclusion of the plaintiffs1 presentation, 
the defendant prior to putting on its case in chief, moved 
the Court to dismiss plaintiffs' Complaint or grant Judgment 
in favor of the defendant, and the Court at that juncture 
requested that counsel for both sides provide written 
memoranda concerning their position so that the Court could 
make the appropriate ruling. The Court after having received 
ATTACHMENT B" 
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CALL ET AL VS. CITY 
OF WEST JORDAN* PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
written memoranda on the two issues raised at this juncture, 
now makes and enters its Memorandum Decision as follows: 
The two issues for determination are: 
1. Whether the matter herein involved should be 
certified for class action under Rule 23, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, and 
2. Whether defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' 
Complaint or as characterized, grant a motion in favor of 
defendant against the plaintiffs should be granted. 
On the first issue concerning the certification of 
class action, the Court after having reviewed the prior 
decisions of Judge Banks and Judge Winder as they are limitedly 
shown in the file, together with the information supporting 
those prior motions and the present status of the file and 
the authorities presented by defendant, now rules that the 
matter should not be certified for class action, and the 
motion for such certification is denied. 
On the second issue, it seems clear from the testimony 
of the witness presented by the defendants, and also by an 
examination of the accounting records as testified to by 
Mr. Sharkey, that the impact fee assessed against the 
Wescall Subdivision was not unreasonable, and on this issue 
the Court finds that the plaintiffs failed to convince this 
Court by a preponderance of the evidence that there was an 
unreasonable fee assessed, and on this basis, therefore, the 
Court grants the defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' 
Complaint, and no cause for action. 
Mr. Stephen Q. Homer is directed to prepare the appropriate 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment, not 
inconsistent with this Memorandum Decision. 
Dated this day of December, 1982. 
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1850 West 7800 South 
West Jordan, Utah 8-CS-i 
Telephone 561-1463 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT CCURT IN AND FOR SALT UttS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN CALL and CLARK JENKINS, 
Plaintiffs 
vs 
CITY OF WEST JORDAN, UTAH, 
Defendant 
FINDINGS GF FACT 
Civil No. C-7S-S29 
The Court, having heard oral testimony on September 1st and 2nd and 
November ISth, 19S2 and having fully examined the exhibits received into 
evidence and having heard the arguments of counsel thereon ar.d having been 
fully apprised in all premises herein, new enters the following 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
22. Prior to the adoption of the Ordinance, tr.e governing body of the City 
conducted a public hearing in which an overall master plan for the develotmer.t 
of the city was discussed. This hearing (held in August 197-) was co-ducted in 
the West Jordan school auditorium so as to accomodate the large number of citizens 
in attendance. The specific concept of flood control and having an imoact fee 
paid by new developers was discussed at that public hearing. The Ordinance was 
prepared by the West Jordan Planning and Zoning Commission, even though rhe 
City Attorney was responsible for the selection of the actual language used 
in the text of the Ordinance. The Plaintiffs submitted no evidence t: shew that 
a public hearing was not held or that the Planning and Zoning Commission did not 
prepare the Ordinance. 
3Y THE CQURT 
DAVID B DEE, District Jjri^ 
ATTACHMENT C 
Dale F. Gardiner 
MATHESON, JEPPSON & GARDINER 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
419 East First South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84U1 
Telephone: 363-2244 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN CALL, an individual, 




CITY OF WEST JORDAN, 
Defendant. 
AMENDED MOTION TO MODIFY ORDkR 
APPOINTING MASTER 
Civil Nb. C-78-82*/ 
Plaintiffs, having stipulated with defendant that their motion 
for an award of attorney's fees for failure to make discovery and 
motion to modify order appointing master may be separated and heard 
before District Judge Kenneth Rigtrup and District Judge Dean Conder, 
comes new and amends its motion to modify the order .appointing master 
as follows: 
Plaintiffs move the Court for an order requiring defendant City 
of West Jordan (1) to pay the initial fee of the master and (2) to pay 
the fee for the master's final reuort. 
In the alternative, plaintiffs move the Court for an order 
terminating the master and excusing plaintiff's from paying for the 
master's final report. 
DATED this /J/^ day of January, 1982. 
MATHESON, JEPPSON & GARDINER 
Br /M 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
419 Easft First South 
Salt L^ke City, Utah 84111 
Dale F. Gardiner 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a copy"of the foregoing Amended 
Motion to Modify Order Appointing Master was hand delivered to 
Stephen G. Homer, West Jordan City Attorney, 1850 West 7800 South, 
I, t h i s JL/U <*aY of West J o r d a n , UT 84084, f January, 19 82. ^ - 7 / , 
ATTACHMENT D 
ROBERT J. DEBRY - A0 849 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants 
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Appellant (Call) respectfully petitions this Court 
to rehear that portion of its opinion which refuses to 
certify this case as a class action. In support of this 




REHEARING IS NECESSARY 
BECAUSE THE COURT'S OPINION IS BASED UPON 
CONJECTURE AND SPECULATION OUTSIDE OF THE RECORD 
The central issue on class certification was 
whether or not Rule 23(a) (1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
had been met. This is often referred to as the numerosity 
requirement, 
A. THE COURT fS OPINION WAS BASED UPON A CORRECT LEGAL 
PRINCIPLE. 
During the briefing, Call argued that the size of 
the class was approximately one hundred members. Call 
further argued that classes of forty or more members would 
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be presumed to satisfy Rule 23(a)(1). 
This Court ruled that a finding on Rule 23(a)(1) 
should not be based upon numbers alone. This Court ruled 
that the Court ought to look at other factors in deciding 
whether or not joinder is "impracticable." See Slip Opinion 
at p. 5 & 6. 
"One or more members of a class may sue or be sued 
representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the cla 
is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable 
Rule 23(a)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
2 
". . .The difficulty inherent in joining as few as for 
class members should raise a presumption that joinder 
impracticable, and the plaintiff whose class is that large 
larger should meet the test of Rule 23(a)(1) on that fa 
alone." Newberg on Class Actions, 2 Ed., §3.05 at p. 142. 
2 
Call concedes that this Cottrt's legal analysis is 
correct. Newberg states the rule as follows: 
But numbers are only one of several 
considerations. Apart from class size, 
factors relevant to the jolinder imprac-
ticability issue include judicial 
economy arising from the avoidance of a 
multiplicity of actions^ geographic 
disbursement of class members, size of 
individual claims, financial resources 
of class members, the ability of claim-
ants to institute individual suits, and 
requests for prospective injunctive 
relief which will involve future class 
members. 
Newberg on Class Actions, 2nd Ed., 
§3.06. 
B. THIS COURT ERRED IN APPLYING THE FACTS TO CORRECT LEGAL 
PRINCIPLES. 
After reaching a correct legal conclusion, this 
Court applied facts to the law. However, in so doing, this 
Court resorted to speculation and conjecture outside the 
record. Specifically, this Court speculated that the 
putative class members: 
. . .are developers engaged in business 
whose claims are not so insubstantial 
that joinder or individual suits would 
not merit the cost. 
If true, that is of course a key fact which fits 
into the Court's legal analysis. However, there is no 
factual basis for that speculation. Certainly, Judge Dee 
did not make any such finding. The true facts are that: 
A. Approximately 60% of the claims of putative 
class members are for less than $10,000. 
B. Approximately 44% of the claims of putative 
class members are for less than $5,000. 
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C. Approximately 26% of the claims for putative 
class members are less than $2,500. 
D« Approximately 8% of the claims of putative 
class members are for less than $1,000. 
(R. 895-896.3) 
There is simply no factual basis to suppose that 
people with claims of $1,000 to $5,000 can afford the ex-
pense and risk of individual litigation. After all, this 
case has already consumed eight years risk of individual 
litigation and three Supreme Court opinions. 
If this opinion is permitted to stand, it will 
mean that there can never be a class action in Utah unless 
the damages are less than $500 per person. That is simply 
not the law in any other jurisdiction (state or federal) . 
Rather, the correct rule is as follows: 
It is important to note that though the 
existence of small claims may be a 
strong element in approving class 
actions, the presence of large claims is 
not a ground for class denial. 
Newberg on Class Actions, 2nd Ed., 
§4.39 at p. 363. 
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This is only a partial list of subdivisions. 
Compare R. 191-192. 
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POINT TWO 
REHEARING IS NECESSARY-AS SEVERAL 
IMPORTANT ISSUES REMAIN IN THE CASE 
Call has urged that this case be certified under 
. . 4 
Rule 23(b) (1) (A) , Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Indeed, 
Call has pointed out that Rule 23(b)(1)(A) was invented for 
this specific type of case: 
To illustrate: separate actions by 
individuals against a municipality to 
declare a bond issue invalid. . .to 
prevent or limit the making of a partic-
ular appropriation or to compel or to 
invalidate an assessment. . . 
Notes of the Advisory Committee on 
Rules, 39 F.R.D. 100. 
follows: 
This Courtfs opinion disposes of that argument as 
Because of our ruling on the merits of 
the case, there is no possibility of 
inconsistent judgments and no issua of 
substantial public interest remains. 
Slip Opinion, at p. 6^  
"The prosecution of separate actions by or against 
individual members of the class would create a risk of 
[inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to 
individual members of the class which would establish 
incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the 
class-" 
That is a dangerous rule which has apparently never been 
followed by any court in the U.S. This precendent would invite 
trial courts to always deny claims for class certification 
under Rule 23(b) (1) (A) . The trial court would always be upheld 
on appeal because an appellate court could always say that 
there is no chance for inconsistent judgments after the ruling 
on the merits. In short, this opinion would emasculate Rule 
23(b)(1)(A). For a case which so holds, see India v. United 
Air Lines, Inc., 83 F.R.D. 1, 12 at paragraph 20, (N.D. Cal. 
1979) . 
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However, the Court1s opinion overlooks the fact 
that other important issues remain in the case. 
For example, Call has prayed for injunctive 
relief. (R. 331-343, See Prayer at paragraphs K b ) , 2(b), 
3(b), 4(b), 5(b), 6(b), and 7(b).) Although this Court has 
ruled on the merits, the case must now be returned to con-
sider the shape of any injunctive relief. It is not likely 
that West Jordan will roll over and play dead on the injunc-
tion issue. Certainly, the shape of the injunction will 
have impact on all putative class members. 
There is also an important statute of limitations 
issue left in the case. West Jordan is not ready to pay out 
claims to all comers. Rather, West Jordan has taken the 
position that the statute of limitations bars all other 
putative class members. (See Exhibit A.) Thus, the trial 
court must decide whether the statute of limitations has 
been tolled by reason of the class action. That is 
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obviously an issue that will have classwide applications. 
Because of the trial court1s-adverse rulings, West Jorc 
has had no reason to raise the statute of limitations defer 
until now. 
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It is true that West Jordan mades no statute 
limitations claim against Call. Or, in other words, \ 
statute of limitations issue is moot as to Call. However, 
is settled that Call may still litigate class issues that n 
be moot as to him. See Deposit Guarantee Natl. Bank v. Rope 
445 U.S. 326 (1980); and, United States Parole Comm. 
Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388 (1980). See also, Newberg on Clc 
Actions, 2nd Ed., §2.32 and §2.33. 
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Finally, there is an important issue remaining of 
a civil rights violation under 42 U.$.C. §1983. (See R. 338 
at paragraphs 38-41.) Because of the adverse rulings of the 
lower court, that issue has been moot. However, the civil 
rights claim is now ripe for further proceedings in the 
trial court. 
In summary, there are important issues remaining. 
Thus, is is too soon to discard the class device as unneces-
sary. 
POINT THREE 
REHEARING IS NECESSARJf BECAUSE 
THE COURT HAS OVERLOOKED OVERWHELMING 
AUTHORITY ON THE ISSUE OF INDIVIDUALIZED DAMAGES 
This Court has denied class certification, in 
part, because: 
Judicial economy would be little served 
because the amount of the claim of each 
class member would still need to be 
determined on an individual basis, 
regardless of class action status. 
Slip Opiniony at p. 6. 
Virtually, no other court (state or federal) has 
adopted such a rule: 
Though at least some courts have 
suggested that differences in the amount 
of damages claimed will make a plain-
tiff s claim atypical, most courts have 
declined even to consider that argument, 
and nearly all of those that have ruled 
on it have rejected it outright.^ If 
differences in amounts of individual 
damages would make a class action 
improper, a class action for damages 
would never be possible, because varia-
tions in amount of damages among class 
members are inevitable unless they 
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happen to be identically situated 
factually, which is not required under 
Rule 23. The existence of a class ac-
tion provision for damage actions itself 
indicates that the drafters of the rule 
contemplated certifications for classes 
raising common liability issues, even 
where the amounts of damages claimed 
varied among class members. 
Newberg on Class Actions, 2nd Ed.
 f 
§3.16. 
See also, Appellant's Reply Brief, at p. 34 and 35. 
If this opinion is permitted to stand, it will 
serve as an erroneous precedent for hundreds of other class 
actions now pending in the trial courts. 
POINT FOUR 
THE CASE SHOULD BE RETURNED TO THE 
TRIAL COURT FOR REPROCESSING BECAUSE THE 
TRIAL COURT FAILED TO MAKE ANY FINDING OF SUBSTANCE 
This Court has observed that the correct standard 
of review is whether the trial court abused its discretion. 
(Slip Opinion, at p. 5.) However, how can this Court review 
the trial court's discretion when it doesn't know what the 
trial court had in mind? See Gibson v. Supercargoes & 
Checkers of Intl. Longshoremen's Union, 543 F.2d 1239 at n.2 
(9th Cir. 1976). Moreover, the absence of adequate findings 
was an invitation for this Court to speculate on facts. 
(See Point One above.) 
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During the briefing, Call advised the Court of 
this defect in the record. See Appellant's Reply Brief, at 
p. 35, n.13. See also Gulf Oil v, Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 68 
L.Ed. 2d 693, 101 S. Ct. 2193 (1981); India v. United Air 
Lines, Inc., 565 F.2d 554, 562 (9th Cir. 1977); Eisenberg v. 
Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770 (3rd Cir. 1985). 
In Eisenberg, supra, the appellate court refused 
to make its own findings on class issues: 
First, we find it difficult to 
evaluate, on a cold record, several of 
the remaining prerequisites to a 
23(b)(3) class action, which the dis-
trict court did not address. . . 
Second, class actions depend on the 
continuing supervision of the district 
court, including reconsideration of the 
efficacy of class action treatment as 
the circumstances change. One circum-
stance that has clearly changed is that 
Eisenberg & Nissen have won a judgment 
on the merits. [Emphasis added.] 
See also, India v. United Airlines, supra, for a 
case where the appellate court remanded for the trial court 
to enter appropriate findings. ~ 
DATED this S d a y of TH^") , 1986. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-
Appellants 
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